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UNITED STATES

v.
564.54 ACRES OF LAND
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

The government seek-s to reverse a ruling

that private, non-profit organizations upon condemnation of
their property can receive substitution costs instead of fair
market value if the organization's property serves a "public
benefit".
,_

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

The government initiated

condemnation proceedings in 1970 against property owned by the

EJ ,·sUA.~~ -
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2.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church of
America and used as a summer camp for young people.

The camp

was operated on a non-profit basis, and one of its several
functions was to permit inner-city children to spend some time
in the country.

The Synod, anticipating the proceedings,

earlier had purchased a replacement site in the Poconos.

The

Synod offered to prove that the cost of developing new camps on
the replacement site would be $ 5.8 million.

The government

contended fair market value did not exceed $ 485,000.

A large

part of this discrepancy apparently is due to environmental and
other regulations which, because of grandfathering, do not
apply to the existing facility but would to a new camp.

The

district court ruled that the Synod would be entitled only to
the fair market value of the property, not the cost of
obtaining a substitute facility.
under 28

u.s.c.

§

On an interlocutory appeal

1292(b), the Third Circuit reversed.

United

States v. 564.54 Acres, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974) (Hastie,
Gibbons, Weis).

Although fair market value was the standard

measure of damages in a condemnation proceeding, courts
traditionally had applied substitution costs as an alternative
measure when the condemnee was a government entity under a
legal obligation to replace the facility condemned.

More

recent decisions also had allowed substitution costs even where
the government entity was not obligated legally to provide the
services, as long as the public benefits derived from the
property were "necessary" to the community.

The court saw no

reason to distinguish private, non-profit entities from

3.
governmental bodies, as both could provide public benefits.
Accordingly, the Synod would be entitled to receive
substitution costs if it could prove that the property
condemned provided a community benefit.
The question whether the property provided a community
benefit, thus entitling the Synod to substitution costs, was
put to the jury, which answered an interrogatory to that effect
in the negative.

The jury also returned a verdict for the

Synod of $ 740,000.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit
reversed.

In arguing to the jury that the camp was not a non-

profit facility, the government argued that, in light of the
various religious facilities which the camp contained, the
Synod was realizing a "religious profit" which rendered it
ineligible to receive the higher valuation.

Further, the jury

was instructed that the camp could be regarded as "reasonably
necessary" to a community benefit, and therefore eligible for
the higher valuation, only if it fulfilled a community need
that otherwise would go unmet.

The government's argument was

error, as pecuniary profit was the only criterion for nonprofit status.

The instruction · was too restrictive, as

property should qualify for the higher valuation if it provided
any community benefit, even if not "necessary" in the sense of
•indispensible".

District Judge Stern concurred.

He believed

the earlier interlocutory decision was wrong and objectionable,
but as he lacked the power to vote for a rehearing he felt
constrained to follow the prior decision.

Judge Rosenn

4.

dissented, arguing that the government's improper remarks · were
cured by corrective instructions and that the instructions on
community benefit were not erroneous.
CONTENTIONS:

The government contends the application

of the substitution costs standard to non-governmental entities
by the court below is unprecedented and erroneous.

The

standard entails a substantial subsidy and windfall profits,
inasmuch as depreciation of the condemned property is not
deducted from the award.

Hence the condemnee is able to

replace depreciated facilities with new ones at public expense.
This standard makes sense when · the facilities are unique and
nonmarketable, such as streets, highways, and bridges, and
where the condemnee lies under an obligation, either legal or
practical, to replace the facilities condemned.

But private

entities, unlike governmental bodies, are not so obliged and
should not receive such a subsidy.

Further, it is wrong to

permit such a substantial difference in valuation to hinge on a
jury determination of public benefit.

Such an open-ended

inquiry invites discrimination and unfairness.

The inquiry is

especially objectionable in cases such as this one, where the
condemnee is a religious organization and its facility had a
religious purpose.

Inviting a jury to decide which religious

functions provide a public benefit presents serious First
Amendment problems.
The Synod argues that the indemnification principles
applied here are well-settled and that the decision below does
not represent a departure from prior law.

There are no First

s.
Amendment overtones, as the secular purpose of the facility,
and n6t its religious sponsorship, is the only question for the
jury.

Finally, the decision below is interlocutory, and the

government still might win after a new trial.
DISCUSSION:

Contrary to respondent's assertions, the

decision below constitutes a substantial extension of the
substitute cost valuation method and lacks any precedent.
Neither the court below nor respondent have cited a single case
where a private party was allowed to benefit from the
substitution costs standard.

The first Third Circuit decision

did cite Brown v. United States, i63 U.S. 78 (1923), as
authority for the application of the substitution costs
standard to non-governmental entities.

Brown involved a

challenge to the government's authority to condemn land needed
to relocate a town which had been uprooted by the construction
of a reservoir.

The Court held that the condemnation power

properly extended to the obtaining of property needed to
substitute for private property condemned for a public purpose.
There was no valuation issue in that case at all.
As the government points out, substitution cost is a
fair measure of damages where, for one reason or another, the
condemnee must replace the facilities.

Among other things, the

standard recognizes that an entity which must obtain new
property at any cost does not have the same bargaining power as
one which can wait until the price is right.

In such

situations, the standard simply provides an alternative means
of arriving at the true value of property when market

6.

distortions prevent the realization of fair market value.

The

decision below turned this rationale on its head and regarded
substitution costs as a subsidy to be given to "good works",
rather than as an evaluation method.

Further, the standard

applied is both unfair and potentially discriminatory.

It is

unfair because not only non-profit organizations provide
benefits to the community.

As Judge Stern's opinion points

out, a factory that provides employment also renders a
substantial community benefit.

The standard is potentially
-

discriminatory because it is so amorphous, and invites juries
to favor functions they 1 ike. - Contrary to respondent's
contentions, relgious purposes will be a factor in this
evaluation.
Finally, if review is granted now and the decision of
- the court below is

reverse~ the

jury verdict can be reinstated

A

i
I

I

'

and there will be no need for a new trial.

In this sense, the

case is not interlocutory and is ripe for review.
There is a response.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm

·

No. 78--488
United States, Petitioner,

v.
564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less,
situated in Monroe and Pike
Counties, Pennsylvania,
et al.

~

~

On Writ of Certiorltl'i
to the United States
Court of Appeals for ( Jt1.1
the Third Circuit.
v f........- -

[May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is the proper measure of compensation
when the Government condemns property owned by a private
nonprofit organization and operated for a public purpose. In
particula.r, we must decide whether the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment 1 requires payment of replacement cost rather than fair market vall.le of the property taken.

I
Respondent, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the
Lutheran Church in America, operates three nonprofit summer camps along the Delaware River: In June 1970, the
United States initiated a condemnation proceeding to acquire
respondent's land for- a public recreational project. Before
trial, the Government offered to pay respondent $485,400 as
the fair market value of its property. Respondent rejected the
offer· and demanded approxi:ina.tely $5.8 million, the asserted
cost of developing functionally equiva,Jent substitute facilities
1 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides in pertinent part:
''nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."

)

~~

~

~
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at a new site. This substantial award was necessary, respondent contended, because the new facilities would be subject to
financially burdensome regulations from which existing facilities were exempt tJnder grandfather provisions.
In a pretrial ruling, the District Court held that the "substitute facilities," or replacement cost, measure of compensation was available only to governmental condemnees, and
that respondent therefore was entitled only to the fair market
value of its property. App. 38-48. On interlocutory appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 506 F.
2d 796 ( 1974). Relying on other circuit court decisions, 2 the
Court of Appeals determined that in condemnations of property belonging to States or their subdivisions, the Fifth
Amendment requires an award of replacement cost "so tha.t
the functions carried out by or on behalf of members of the
community may be continued." Id., at 799-800. 3 Since the
Fifth Amendment refers expressly to private but not to public
property, the court reasoned that the Framers could not have
('intended to impose a greater obligation of indemnification"
toward public entities than toward private owners. Id., at
801. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals applied standards
governing condemnations of publicly owned property, and
held that substitute facilities compensation was available to
2 Sec, e. g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2
1968); United States v. Board of Education of Mineral County, 253 F.
2d 670 (CA4 1958); State of Washington v. United States, 214 F . 2d 33
(CA9), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954); City of Fort Worth v. Unitea
States, 188 F. 2d 217· (CA5 1951) .
3 This Court has not passed on the propriety of substitute facilities compensation for public condemners. Although the Court oJ Appeals cited
Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78 (1923), as "the genesis of the substitution of facilities method of mrasuring fair compensation," 576 F. 2d
796, 802 (CA3 1977), that case addressed the scope of the Government's
condemnation power, not the compensation rrquisite under the Fifth
Amendment. In light of our di~position of this rasr, wr rxprrss noopinion on the appropriate measure of compensation for publicly owned
property.
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private nonprofit owners if there was no "ready market" for
the condemned property and if the facilities were "reasom~bly
necessary to public welfare." ld., at 800. The case was remanded to the District Court for consideration of whether
respondent's property met this test.
After a 10-day trial, the District Court instructed the jury
regarding the prerequisites for a substitute facilities award.
In particular, the court charged that there was no "ready
market" for respondent's facilities if "the fair market value
of the condemned property [was] substantially less than the
cost of constructing functionally equivalent substitute facilities." See 576 F. 2d 983. 992 n. 9 (CA3 1977). The District
Court further instructed that the property was "reasonably
necessary to public welfare~' if it "fulfill [ ed] a community
need or purpose." See id., at 995 n. 16. The jury found
that respondent was not entitled to substitute facilities compensation, and after considering additional evidence, awarded
$740,000 as the fair market value of the property.
A different panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. !d., at
996. Although the court found that the jury instructions on
the ready-market issue were not fundamentally in error, 4 it
disagreed with the District Court's interpretation of the
reasonable necessity requirement. Under the Court of
Appeals' theory, this test was met if the facility "provide[d]
a benefit to the community that [would] not be as fully pro~
vided after the facility [was] taken." !d., at 995. Because
the jury instruction had been framed in terms of necessity
rather than community benefit, the court concluded that a
4

The Court of Appeals, however, did seek to clarify the ready-market
criterion, holding that
"regardless of whether tlw Synod rould have sold the ramps, and regardlf:'ss of whethf:'r the camps had fair market value, this condition ... is met
if the Synod could not havf' rPplacf'd thf' camps' facilitie~ in the market
place for a cost roughly equivalent to the fair market value of the ramps."

'576 F. 2d 983, 991 (CA3 1977) .
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new trial was required. One judge, concurring, agreed that
the trial court's charge had not been consistent with the Court
of Appeals' interlocutory decision, but argued that the prior
opinion, although controlling, was incorrect. !d., at 996-1000.
The third member of the panel dissentea on the ground that
the District Court had adhered to the principles previously
enunciated in the interlocutory opinion. 1d., at 1001-1010.
We granted certiorari, U. S. (1978), and now
reverse.

II
A

In giving content to the just compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. this Court has sought to put the owner
of condemned property "in as good a position pecuniarily as
if his property had not been taken." Olson v. United States,
292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934). 5 However, this principle of indemnity has not been given its full and literal force. Because
of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth au individual places on particular property at a given time, we
have recognized the need for a relatively objective working
rule. See United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 374 ( 1943);
United States v. Cars, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). The Court
therefore has employed the concept of fair market value to
determine the condemnee's loss. Under this standard, the
owner is entitled to receive "what a willing buyer would
pay in cash to a willing seller" at the time of the taking.
United States v. Miller, supra, at 374; accord, City of New
York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 55, 61 (1915); United States v. Virgina
Accord, Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312,
326 (1892); United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, :373 (1943); United
States v. Vi1·ginia Electric Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 633 (1961); United
States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 16 ( 1970); Almota Farmers Elevator ana
Warehouse Co . v. United States, 409 U, S, 470, 473-474 (1973).
5
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Electric Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Almota Farmers
Elevator and Warehouse Co., 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
Although the market value standard is a useful and generally sufficient tool for ascertaining the compensa.tion required to make the owner whole, 6 the Court has acknowledged
that such an award does not necessarily compensate for all
values an owner may derive from his property. Thus, we
have held that fair market value does not include the special
value of property to the owner arising from its adaptability
to his particular use. United States v. Miller, supra, at 374375; United States v. Cors, supra, at 332. As Justice Frankfurter explained in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
u.s. 1, 5 (1949) :
"The value of property springs from subjective needs and
attitudes; Its value to the owner may therefore differ
widely from its value to the taker. Most things, how~
ever, have a general demand which gives them a value
transferable from one owner to another. As opposed to
such personal and variant standards as value to the particular owner whose property has been taken, this transferable value has an external validity which makes it a
fair measure of public obligation to compensate the loss
incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his property for public use. In view, however, of the liability of
all property to condemnation for the common good, loss
to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his
unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment
to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is
properly treated as part of the burden of common
citizenship."
ThP ~tandard i~ mo;;1 arrurate with rpspect to readily salablP articlPs,
for rxample, merchandi:se, bPcau;;e thr valur of such propPrty i:s ordinarily
what it can command in tlw markPtplace. SPe United States v. Toronto,
Hamilton & Buffa,lo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 404 (1949) .
6

77-488-0PINION
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See 1 L. Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 14 (2d ed.
1953). In short, the concept of fair market value has been
chosen to strike a fair "balance between the public's need and
the claimant's loss" upon condemnation of property for a public purpose. Un·ited States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Navigation Co., 338 U. S. 396, 402 (1949); see also United
States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266. 280 (1943).
But while the indemnity principle must yield to some extent
before the need for a practical general rule, this Court has
refused to designate market value as the sole measure of just
compensation. For there are situations where this standard
is inappropriate. As we held in Um'ted States v. Commodities
Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) :
" [W] hen market value has been too difficult to find or
when its application would result in manifest injustice to
the owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied
other standards. . . . Whatever the circumstances under
which such constitutional questions arise. the dominant
consideration always remains the same: What compensation is 'just' both to an owner whose property is taken
and to the public that must pay the bill?" (Footnote
omitted.)
See also United States v. Cars, supra, at 332; United States v.
Toronto, Hamilton, & Buffalo Navigation Co., supra, at 402;
United States v. Miller, supra, at 374. 7 Hence. we must determine whether application of the fair market value standard
here would be impracticable or whether an award of market
value would diverge so substantially from the indemnity principle as to violate the Fifth Amendment.
1 To be sure , the is,;ne in the~e easeR was whether the asserted market
value exceeded the compensation necessary to indemnify the condemnees.
But " the principle, as ~tated in the Commodities 'l'rading opinion , must
work both ways." i\Iatte1' of Valuation Proceedings, 445 F . Supp. 994,
1Da1 (Sp. Cf R . R. R . A. 1977) (Friendly, J .).

77-488-0PINJON
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B
The instances in which market value is too difficult to as~
certain generally involve prop~rty of a type so infrequel1tly
traded that we cannot predict whether the prices previously
paid, assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated
in a sale of the condemned property. See United States v.
Toronto, Hamilton, & Buffalo Navigation Co., supra, at 402;
cf. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S., at 374-375. This might
be the case, for example, with respect to public facilities such
a:s roads or sewers. But respondent's property does not fall
in this category. 8 There was a market for camps, albeit not
an extremely active one. The Government's expert witness
presented evidence concerning 11 recent sales of comparable
facilities in the vicinity, and estimated that respondent's
camps could have been sold within six months to a year after
they were offered for sale. Tr. 256-258, 263-264, 269-276.
Indeed. respondent's own expert testified that he had prepared
an appraisal of the camps' fair market value on the date of
the taking. App. 143-144. And the Court of Appeals implicitly acknowledged that the market value of nonprofit property is ordinarily ascertainable since application of the court's
r'ready market" criterion requires assessment of fair market
value. See n. 4, supra. Thus, it seems clear that respondent's property had a readily discernible market value. Theonly remaining inquiry is whether such an award would impermissibly deviate from the indemnity principle.
8 The jury's determination that the camps had a market value of
$740,000 does not r0solve the issue whether market vn,lue was in fact
aRcertainable. That issue depends on whether evidence could feasibly be
obtained to presrnt a jury question on the appropriate market value.
Such an inquiry is related to the one an appellate court would undertake
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's market
value determination . However, in the latter circumstance, the issue would
be whether evidence waH in fact presented from which the jury could'
1:ati:onally art:lve at ils result.
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Emphasizing that the primary value of the condemned
property lies in the use to which it is put, respondent argues
that mat!ret O'&>Wp!!~~ would be unjust in the present
con ext. Because new facilities would bear financial burdens
imposed by regulations to which the existing camps were not
subject, an award of market value would preclude continuation of respondent's use. Brief for Respondent 5. Respondent therefore concludes that such a recovery would be insufficient to indemnify for its loss. See 506 F. 2d, at 798.
However, it is not at all unusual that property uniquely
adapted to the owner's use has a market value on condemnation which falls far short of enabling the owner to preserve
that use. Such a situation may often arise, for example,
where a family home has been built to the owner's tastes, but
is old and deteriorated, or where a structure, like respondent's
camps, is exempt from regu1ations applicable to new facilities.
Cf. 1 L. Orgel. ~ 14, at 172. Yet the Court has previously
determined that nontransferable values arising from the
owner's unique need for the property are not compensable,
and has found that this divergence from full indemnification ~
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. See supra, at ~
We are unable to discern why a different result should
obtain here. That respondent is a nonprofit organization may
provide some basis for distinguishing it from business enter~~~
prises, since the uses to which commercial property:_~~~.~~_:-;· ~
often be valued in terms of the capitalized earnings produced.
See 506 F. 2d, at 799; 1 L. Orgel, supra, ~ 157. Cf. United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338
U. S., at 403. But there is no reason to treat respondent
differently from the many private homeowners and other noncommercial property-owners who neither derive earnings from
their property nor hold it for investment purposes. Unless
the Just Compensation Clause mandates a Government subsidy for nonprofit organizations, a proposition we find patently
implausible, respondent's nonprofit status does not require us
to reject application of the fair market value standard.

77-488-0PINION
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Nor is it relevant in this case whether respondent's camps
were reasonably necessary to the public welfare. In condemnations of property owned by public entities, lower courts
have applied the reasonable necessity standard to determine if
the entity has an obligation to continue providing the facilities taken. See, e. g. , 506 F. 2d, at 800; United States v.
Streets, Alleys& Public Ways, 531 F. 2d 882, 886 (CA81976);
United States v. Certain Property, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2 1968).
This duty may be legally compel1ed or arise from necessity;
"the distinction has little practical significance in public condemnation." 403 F. 2d, at 803 (citation omitted). If the
condemnee has such a duty to replace the property, these
courts have reasoned that only an award of the costs of developing requisite substitute facilities will compensate for the
loss.
Whatever the merits of this reasoning with respect to publie
entities, see n. 3, supra, it does not advance analysis here. For
respondent is under no legal or factual obligation to replace
the camps, regardless of their social worth. As a private
entity, respondent is free to direct its resources to serve its
own institutional objectives, which may or may not correspond
with community needs. Awa.rding replacement cost on the
theory that respondent would continue to operate the camps
for a public purpose would thus provide a windfall if substitute facilities were never acquired, or if acquired, were later
sold or converted to another use.
Finally, that the camps may have benefited the community
does not warrant compensating respondent differently from
other private owners. The community benefit which the
camps conferred might provide an indication of the public's
loss upon condemnation of the property. But we cannot
accept the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this loss is relevant to assessing the compensation due a private entity. The
court noted that "[o]ne rationale for the substitute facilities
measure is to indemnify not only the owner of the condemned
facilities, but those who have an interest in the continuing

77-488-0PINION
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existence of the facilities. in this case, according to the Synod,
the general public." 576 F. 2d. at 989 n. 4. The guiding
principle of just compensation, however, is that the owner of
the condemned property "must be made whole but is not
entitled to more." Olson v. United States, 292 U. S., at 255.
Respondent did not hold its property as the public's trustee
and thus is not entitled to be indemnified for the public's
loss. Moreover, many condemnees use their property in a
manner that confers a benefit on the community, and there i!!!
no sound basis for considering this factor only in condemna~
tions of property owned by nonprofit organizations. And to
make the measure of compensation depend on a jury's subjec~
tive estimation of whether a particular use "benefits" the
community would conflict with this Court's efforts to develop
practical valuation standards.
In sum, we find no circumstances here that require suspen~
sion of the normal rules for determining just compensation.
Respondent, like other private owners, is not entitled to recover for nontransferable values arising from its unique need
for the property. To the extent denial of such an award
departs from the indemnity principle, it is justified by the
necessity for a workable measure of valuation. Allowing.
respondent the fair market value of its property is thus con~
sistent with the "basic equitable principles of fainwss," United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,490 (1973), underlying the Just
Compensation Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed~
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May 3, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

77-488 - United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land

Dear Thurgood:
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

May 3, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 78-488 - United States v. 564.64 Acres of Land

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

H. A.B.

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS

.JUSTICE

w....

May 3, 1979

Or

.J . BRENNAN, JR.

·I

RE: No. 78-488

United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land

Dear Thurgood:
I agree .
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Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

Ma y 3 , 1979

78 - 488 U. S . v . 564 . 54 Acres

Dear Thurgooo:
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
I took no part in the consi~Pration o~ decision of this case .

Mr. J u stice Marshall
l fP / SS
c c:

The

Confer~nce
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 4, 1979

Re:

No. 78-488 - United States v. 564.54 Acres - of Land

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.

Sincerely'./

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CH AM BERS OF

JUSTICE J OH N P A UL STEVE N S

May 4, 1979

Re:

78-488 - United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

~~
Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAM!5ERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 8, 1979

Dear Thurgood:
Re:

78-488

u.s.

v. 564.54 Acres of Land, Etc.

I join.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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To: The Chief Justice
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Mr . J u scJ.GG Marshall
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-488
United States, Petitioner,

v.

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States
564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less,
Court of Appeals for
situated in Monroe and Pike
the
Third Circuit.
Counties, Pennsylvania,
et al.
[May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE WHITE, concurring in the opmwn and the
judgment.
The Court rejects the claim that the measure of compensation in this case is the cost of substitute facilities rather than
the fair market value of the taken property, here a camp
owned by a private, nonprofit corporation. I am in full
agreement. The substitute facilities doctrine is unrelated to
fair market value and does not depend on whether fair market
value is readily ascertainable; rather, it unabashedly demands
additional compensation over and above market value in order
to allow the replacement of the condemned facility. 1 In those
cases where it has been applied, primarily where public facilities have been condemned, the basic premise is that the condemnee is under some obligation to continue the functions
performed on the taken property. 2 But I do not understand
See 576 F. 2d 983, 991 (CA3 1977), quoted ante n. 4; United States v.
Streets, Alleys & Public Ways, 5;31 F. 2d 882 (CA8 1976); United States v.
Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2 1968);
United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F. 2d 690
(CA2 1965); United States v. Board of Education, 253 F. 2d 690 (CA4
195 ) ; National Conferrncc of Commis~ioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Eminent Domain Code,§ 1004 (b).
2
See, e. g., United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, supra.
at 694; 576 F. 2d, at 992-995.
1

Powell
R·,hnquist
St evens
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how a duty to replace the condemned facility justifies paying
more than market value. Obviously, replacing the old with a
new facility will cost more than the value of the old, but the
new facility will its<'lf be more valuable and last longer." This
is true with respect to condemnation of any facility, whether
or not there is an obligation to reproduce it, and I had not
understood -i;hat --the just compensation clause to guarantee
subsidies to either private or public projects. Similarly, if
more demanding building codes or other regulations will
enhance the cost of replacement. it is reasonable to assume
that compliance itself will be of some benefit to the owHer
and hence need not be financed by the condenmor.
It may be that a condemnee's obliga.tion to continue the
function performed on the condemned property aud hence to
replace the facility taken will result in loss of value in that
the condemnee does not have the option of investing his fair~
market~value award in a project that will provide the condemnee with greater net benefits than would replacement of
the taken facility. But the existing law imposing the obliga~
tion presumably embodies the policy ,judgment that alterna~
tive projects, from which the condemnee might or might not
derive more benefits. should not be made available to the
condemnee. Even if some incremental loss due to legal constraints on the obligated condemnee's options is thus imposed,
it is sheer speculation to assume that this loss will be equal
to the full increase in cost of the facility to be reproduced or
replaced. It seems to me that the argument for enhaHced
compensation to the obligated condemnee is nothing more
The ;;ub:;titute faeiliti(•:< measme applied by the Court of Appeals in
thi;; raRe appear:; to contemplate pa~· ment of rPproduction costs, not rrplaeemrnt eol't;;, sre 576 F. 2d, at 999, and n . 2 (Stern, J. , concurring;);
50G F. 2d 796, 799-ROO (CA:11976) (Arres 1). M. noted in United States
v. Certain Prope1·ty i11 Borough of Manhattan. supra, at 804, court::; appl~r
ing the ~ub;,;titutr facilities measurr have taken diffrrrnt po~itiou;,; regarding whether depreciation should be deducted from the cost of :1 uew
3

facility.
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than a particularized submission that the award should exceed
fair market value because of the unique uses to which the
property has been put by the condemnee or because of the
unique value the property has for it.
I thus agree with the Court that the just compensation
clause does not require payment of the cost of a substitute
facility where the condemnee is a private organization, even
if it could be said that such an owner is in some sense obligated to replace the property " or that the public has a stake
in the continuance of the function that is being carried on the
taken property." I also have substantial doubt that the clause
should be auy difl'erently construed and applied where public
property is comlemned, whether or not the function conducted
on the property must be continued at another location. That
issue, however, is not before the Court and is expressly put
aside for another clay.

The Comt ~<tatrs that respondent. "is under no legal or factual obligation to replare the camps .... " Although respondent. which is subject to
the Pennsylvania Non-Profit Corporation Law of 1972, Pa. C. S. § 7549
(1975), apparently is not legally obliged to replace its camps, othrr private,
nonprofit entrrprise~< ma~· b<' under a legal obligation-imposed by their
own articles of incorporation, h~· the terms under which gifts ar<' mad<' to
tlwm , or direct!~· b~· >:tat<' law-to rontinue financing of certain facilities
or funrtion;; . Indred, private organizations opernted for profit ma~· be
undN contractual or othrr legal obligation to replace a condemned
facility.
5 For \)111'JlOSes of drciding whethPr an obligation to replarr requires a
condrmnation award greatrr than mark<'t value, it is seemingly irrelevant
·to whom tlw brndit,.: of ownrr ·hip may be said to accrue, be thi::; the
"public" or printtc entities.
1
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